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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal from the Order of the District Court
in post-judgment contempt proceedings dismissing
plaintiffs and appellants' Amended Petition For
1

Order To Show Cause di1·ectecl against defendant
and respondent M. Kenneth White and denying the
i·elief sought by said appellants therein.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court issued an Order To Show Cause
di1·ected against defendant M. Kenneth White based
upon the Amended Petition of plaintiffs, ordering
him to appea1· and show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for an alleged violation of the
Decree made and entered on the 1st day of June,
1965· A hearing was held, and based upon the evidence presented at the hearing the trial court found
that defendant M. Kenneth White did not violate the
terms of its Decree dated June 1, 1965 and that said
defendant was not guilty of contempt and, accordingly, entered its Order dismissing plaintiffs'
Amended Petition For Order To Show Cause and
denying the relief sought therein. The narrow issue
on this appeal is whether there is any substantial evidence to support the Findings of the trial court. If
so, the Order of the trial court must be affirmed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent M. Kenneth White seeks to affirm
the Order made and entered by the trial court dismissing appellants' Amended Petition For Order To
Show Cause and denying the relief sought therein.
Hereafter plaintiffs and appellants will be collectively referred to as "Fairfield" and defendant and respondent M. Kenneth White will be referred to as
"White."
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-STATEMENT OF FACTS
White cannot agree with Fairfield's Statement
Of Facts fo1· two basic reasons:
(1) It is impregnated with what the trial court
found or did not find in its 1965 Findings Of
Fact and is but a rehash of past history, now
irrelevant to this proceeding since the 1965 Decree is clear and unambiguous; and
(2) It carefully selects the post 1965 facts as to the
flows of the Fairfield Springs and the operation of White's well most favorable to Fairfield,
contrary to the cardinal rule on appellant review.
And so White makes the following brief Statement
Of Facts, which are the relevant facts on this appeal.
The discharge of the Fairfield Springs was
measured by Fairfield's representatives during the
period from May, 1966 through September, 1970
(Exh. 1; Tr. 13). Those measurements were plotted
as hydrographs, which do not include the 0.12 second
foot of water flowing from White's replacement well
into either of Fairfield's ditches (Exhs. 2, 5; Tr. 17).
White did not pump either of his irriga:tion wells in
1965 (Tr. 42) or in 1966 (R. 12A). He pumped one
well intermittently from October 24, 1967 until August 10, 1970 (R. 12, 12A; Tr. 18). During the entire period of pumping the total discharge of the
Fairfield Springs, as augmented by the 0.12 second
foot flowing from White's replacement well into
3

Fairfield's ditches, did not fall below 4.10 cfs within the tolerance of the accuracy of the measurements
( Exhs. 1, 2, 5; Tr. 35, 42). Likewise, in each year
during which White pumped his well the discharge
of the Fairfield Springs, as augmented by the flow
of the White replacement well, exceeded 1600 acre
feet during the period April 20 to October 20 of each
year (Exh. 6; Tr. 41, 42). White's replacement well
was not pumped during the post-judgment period 1
but flowed 0.12 second foot continuously (Tr. 35)
and was discharged into Fairfield's ditches (Tr. 17).
Based upon the foregoing facts, the trial court found
that White did not violate the provisions of the Decree made and entered herein on the 1st day of June, '
1965 and that he was not guilty of contempt. Thereupon the trial court entered its Order dismissing
Fairfield's Amended Petition For Order To Show
Cause and denied the relief sought therein (R. 16).
From such Order Fairfield filed its Notice Of Appeal
herein (R. 19).
POINT I.
THE DECREE MADE AND ENTERED HEREIN ON THE lST DAY OF JUNE, 1965 IS CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THE RELIEF
SOUGHT BY FAIRFIELD HEREIN SEEKS TO
MODIFY AND CHANGE THE MEANING OF
SAID DECREE.

The crux of this post-judgment proceeding is
whether White violated that provision of paragraph
4 (a) of the 1965 Decree ( R. 4) which provides as
follows:
4

"4. That the defendant White should be
and he is hereby enjoined from producing any
water from his two large irrigation wells
which were drilled under Applications Nos.
22928 and 22826, except upon condition that
he comply with the following replacement order:
" (a) That the irrigation water from Fairfield Springs be maintained at a
minimum flow of 4.10 cubic feet per
second through April 20th to October 20th of each year, and that the
average flow be such as to yield not
less than 1600 acre feet during said
season, . . . "
The foregoing provision is clear and unambiguous
and means exactly what it says. So long as the minimum flow of the Fairfield Springs is maintained at
4.10 cfs or above and the average flow thereof during
the April 20 to October 20 period is such as to yield
1600 acre feet, White is entitled to operate either or
both of his irrigation wells. If either condition is not
satisfied he is enjoined from operating his wells except upon the condition that he replaces water to the
Fairfield Springs to satisfy those conditions. And so
we need only to look to the record of the evidence received at the post-judgment hearing to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence to show
that both conditions were satisfied during the postjudgment periods when White operated his well. If
so, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed·
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176
(1961).
5

We submit that the evidence clearly establishes
that both conditions were satisfied. Thus during the
entire period when White intermittently operated his
well the total discharge of the Fairfield Springs, as
augmented by the 0.12 cfs of water from his replacement well into Fairfield's ditches, did not fall below
4.10 cfs within the tolerance of the accuracy of the
measurements (Exhs. 1, 2, 5; Tr. 42). This was admitted by Fairfield's expert witness Lawrence (Tr.
35) and is effectively conceded by Fairfield on page
5 of its Brief. Likewise in each year during which
White intermittently operated his well the total discharge of the Fairfield Springs, as augmented by the
flow of White's replacement well, exceeded 1600 acre
feet during the period April 20 to October 20 (Exh.
6; Tr. 41, 42). Fairfield offered no evidence to the
contrary, and nowhere in Fairfield's Brief does it
contend otherwise. That being so, it follows that
White did not violate the foregoing provisions of the
1965 Decree, nor was he guilty of contempt as the
trial court properly and correctly so found. It is just
that simple, and that should end the matter in this
Court.
However, Fairfield does not confine its argument to the evidence presented at the post-judgment
hearing nor to the language of the 1965 Decree, as
we say it must. Rather, Fairfield engages in a
lengthy discourse on what the trial court found or
did not find in its 1965 Findings Of Fact and argues
therefrom that Fairfield is the owner of all of the
water which the Fairfield Springs would produce
6
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but for the pumping of White's well, and that as a
condition to White's operating his well he must replace every drop of water which the Fairfield Springs
would have otherwise produced· This Fairfield argues at length without regard to the clear and unambiguous language of paragrph 4 (a) of the Decree.
We say that Fairfield's whole argument is an abortive attempt to indirectly modify the 1965 Decree
and then urge a violation thereof under Fairfield's
modified version. This the trial court would not permit Fairfield to do, and correctly so. That is the sum
and substance of this appeal.
Although we are tempted to ignore Fairfield's
argument as being wholly irrelevant and here end the
dialogue, we feel constrained to point up the fallacy
of it all. Thus at the outset of the post-judgment
hearing in the court below counsel for Fairfield advised the court that it was asking for the further relief of defining the quantity of water Fairfield was
entitled to take and that it was not going to press for
a contempt citation (Tr. 5). The trial court became
concerned with what relief Fairfield there was really
seeking and reiterated that the only question for the
court to determine was whether there had been a violation of the Decree (Tr. 7, 8, 10). In response to
the query of the trial court as to whether Fairfield
was asking for a modification of the Decree, counsel
for Fairfield advised that it was not seeking a modification but just a further '''refinement" of something the Decree didn't decide (Tr. 8, 9, 10).
7

The so-called "refinement" which Fairfield
there sought and which it now urges is that White
should not be permitted to pump one drop of water
unless he simultaneously replaces some unascertainable quantity of water to Fairfield without regard to
whether the Fairfield Springs are producing 4.1 cfs,
6 cfs or 10 cfs or whether Fairfield can beneficially
use all of the waters emanating therefrom. That is
a far cry from what paragraph 4 (a) of the 1965
Decree says. Such refinement would not only modify the 1965 Decree but would render paragraph
4 (a) thereof a nullity.
The irony of it all is exemplified by comparing
the position taken by Fairfield in the prior appeal
(Case No. 10,488) with its position in this postjudgment proceeding. In the prior appeal White
challenged the Findings of the trial court fixing the
constant minimum flow of the Fairfield Springs at
4.10 cfs and a yield therefrom of 1600 acre feet during the irrigation season as the foundation of the
trial court's replacement order. In reply thereto,
Fairfield on page 3 of its p:rior Brief stated its Point
I. B as follows:
"B. The court properly ordered appellant to add sufficient water to the spring to
maintain the flow at 4.10 c.f.s. and to deliver
1600 acre feet per year."
In response to White's challenge to the finding of the
trial court that the Fairfield Springs had ever produced 6 cfs, Fairfield stated on page 5 of its prior
Brief as follows:
8
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"This however, is really an argument
about an immaterial point. The court didn't
order Appellant to replace 6 c.f.s., either as a
rate of flow nor in connection with the total
quantity. The court's order required only 4.10
c.f .s. minimum, and 1,600 acre feet - a quantity which could be delivered with an average
flow of 4.37 c.f.s."
And in response to White's challenge to the 1600 acre
feet, Fairfield stated as one of its sub-points on paragraph 14 of its prior Brief as follows:
7. The court correctly held that Respondents were entitled to receive 1,600 acre feet
during their 183 day irrigation season."
In its prior opin'ion (Fairfield Irrigation Company v. White, 18 Utah 2d 93, 416 P.2d 641) this
Court stated on page 95 of the Utah Reports as follows:
"After a trial, the court entered a decree
enjoining White from pumping his wells except upon specified conditions and prescribing
replacement of water necessary to assure the
plaintiffs the water they are entitled to under
their prior claims to the water of Fairfield
.
. . ."
Sprmgs;
This Court then went on to affirm the conditions imposed by the 1965 Decree to assure Fairfield of the
waters to which it and they are entitled.
After having successfully sustained the 4.10 cfs
and 1600 acre feet conditions in the prior appeal,
Fairfield now comes back via a post-judgment proceeding and seeks to abrogate those conditions by
9

expanding upon its adjudicated rights and by imposing further limitations and restrictions on
White's rights. It now seeks to prohibit White from
pumping a single drop of wa:ter by means of his wells
unless he replaces some 'imaginary quantity which
the Fairfield Springs w o u 1d have theoretically
yielded without his pumping, whether it be 5 cfs, 6
cfs, 7 cfs or, we suppose, 50 cfs. We say that was
all settled in the 1965 Decree, as affirmed by this
Court in 1966, and the conditions imposed under paragraph 4 (a) are those finally adjudicated necessary
to assure Fairfield the waters to which it and they
are entitled. Those conditions are res judicata and
the law of the case and are equally binding on Fairfield as they are on White. They cannot be altered,
changed, modified or refined in this post-judgment
proceeding as Fairfield seeks to do. Were that not
so this litigation would never end.
In Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d
701 (1968) this Court stated the principle here controlling on page 335 of the Utah Reports as follows:
"- .. Litigation must be put to an end,
and it is the function of a final judgment to do
just that. A judgment is the final consideration and determination of a court on matters
submitted to it in an action or proceeding. (49
C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 1)
"If a judgment can mean one thing one
day and something else on another day, there
would be no reason to suppose that the litigation had been set at rest. The same must be
10

said if the judgment can mean one thing to one
judge and something else to another judge. All
are bound by the original language 'USed, and
all ought to interpret the language the same
way. No court should express an opinion of
what the judgment means until the judgment
is called into question by some factual situation relating thereto. The judge who tried the
case and who ought to know what he meant to
say, after the time for appeal, etc., has passed
cannot any more change or cancel one word of
the judgment than can any other judge." (Emphasis ours.)
Here the judge who tried the case and who ought to
know what he meant to say found in this post-judgment proceeding that White did not violate the Decree and denied the relief sought by Fairfield. To
do otherwise would require a cancellation of paragraph 4 (a) of theDecree, which could not be done in
the court below and, we respectfully submit, cannot
be done on this appeal.
While we have no quarrel with the general rule
urged under Point II of Fairfield's Brie! that a decree should be construed as a whole so as to give
meaning to all of its terms, we do take issue with the
way Fairfield goes about attempting to construe the
Decree and with the conclusions it reaches therefrom.
Nowhere in Appellant's Brief does it urge that
the 1965 Decree is ambiguous. We say that the Decree is clear and unambiguous and the rule of interpretation to be here employed is the rule applicable
to an unambiguous judgment. In 46 Am· Jur. 2d,
11

Sec. 72 the rule is stated on page 363 thereof as follows:

" ... If, on the other hand, the judgment
is not ambiguous or uncertain, the parol evidence rule applies, and the written judgment
should be accepted at i'ts face value and without speculating as to the reasoning employed
in reaching the particular result."
Where a judgment is clear and unambiguous, neither
pleadings, findings of fact nor verdict may be resorted to to change its meaning. Chronister v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., (N.M.), 381 P.2d 673 (1963);
Callanv.Callan (Wash.),468P.2d456 (1970). And
as stated in 46 Am· Jur. 2d, Sec. 76, page 365 thereof:

''If, however, a judgment is not ambiguous and leaves nothing for interpretation,
there is no need to refer to the pleadings or
other parts of the record. It is clear that if a
finding is inconsistent with the judgment
proper or decretal part of the judgment, the
latter must control." (Emphasis ours.)
Nowhere in Fairfield's Brief does it point up
any ambiguity in the Decree which would justify its
resort to the Findings Of Fact under the accepted
rules of construction. Yet in Point I of its argument,
under the guise of attempting to construe the Findings and Decree as a harmonious whole, it quotes in
whole or in part or makes some reference to Findings
Nos. 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 26. That we say
is but a rehash of past history settled a long time ago
and has no part in this appeal.
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The sum and substance of Fairfield's rehash of
the 1965 Findings, as we view it, is
(1) that Fairfield owns all of the waters emanating
from the Fairfield Springs, without limitation;
(2) that White's irrigation wells interfere with the
flow of the Fairfield Springs; and
(3) that White is not entitled to pump a single drop
of water unless he simultaneously replaces drop
by drop the water which but for his pumping
would have flowed from the Fairfield Springs.
As to ( 1) above, we agree that the 1965 Decree
awards Fairfield the right to the use of all of the
waters emanating from the Fairfield Springs which
it can beneficially use. The 1600 acre feet gives
Fairfield a duty of 3.5 acre feet per acre for its 454
acres of land during the irrigation season, which we
believe is reasonable. In addition thereto Fairfield
gets another 2.9 acre feet per acre during the nonirrigation season for 280 out of the 454 acres, which
White raised in the prior appeal as being unreasonable but which was affirmed by this Court. 'The position of Fairfield now is that as against White and
all junior appropriators from the basin it owns all
of the waters of the Fairfield Springs without regard
to duty or the other limitations set forth in the Decree. Paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree fixed the conditions under which White can pump and assures Fairfield the waters to which it is entitled. Fairfield has
an absolute guarantee of a minimum flow of 4.1 cfs
13

and a yield of 1600 acre feet during the irrigation
season, and if nature won't provide it White must
if he wants to pump either of his irrigation wells.
We say that Fairfield's position here is untenable
since it hangs on paragraph 1 of the Decree to the
exclusion of the remainder of the Decree and thereby
violates the very principle it so strenuously argues
for under its Point II.
As to ( 2) above, one would think that Fairfield
has to persuade this Court all over again that the
pumping of the White irrigation wells interferes with
the flow of the Fairfield Springs· That was settled
back in 1965 and needs not be rehashed here. Fairfield repeatedly argues that the Decree never gave
White any interest in the Fairfield Springs and
charges over and over again that White has taken
"our water." The fallacy of it all is that White does
not divert water directly from the Fairfield Springs
after the waters therefrom emanate from the underground source. Rather, White diverts water from
the inter-connected underground sources some two
miles away. Fairfield does not have a monopoly on
the entire underground source. It is public water,
and so long as Fairfield's rights are protected in accordance with the Decree White as a junior appropriator is entitled to divert water for his use. The conditions of the Decree have been maintained and Fairfield has received the water to which it is entitled.
As to ( 3) above, Fairfield obviously cannot get
that meaning out of paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree.
14

What Fairfield is really attempting to do is to use
Finding No. 26 'to change the plain language and
meaning of paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree. Thus on
page 12 of its Brief Fairfield emphasizes that Finding No. 26 says in substance that White should be enjoined from pumping his irrigation wells at any time
during any season except upon the condition that the
waters of Fairfield be fully replaced with the same
quantity of water. Yet on page 14 of Fairfield's
Brief it acknowledges that the Decree (paragraph
4 (a) ) does not include that part of the language of
Finding No. 26. If there is any inconsistency between the language of Finding No. 26 and paragraph
4 (a) of the Decree, and we say there is not, then paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree must control. Under the
general rule of construction it is clear that if a finding is inconsistent with the judgment proper or a decretal part of the judgment the latter must control.
46 Am. Jur· 2d, Judgments, Section 76, page 365.
We do not believe that Finding No. 26 is inconsistent with paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree. Thus the
first paragraph of Finding No. 26 is but a general
statement of the necessity for replacement as a condition to White's operating his wells, which relates to
all plaintiffs including those individual plaintiffs
who have flowing wells. The last sentence thereof expressly makes the sub-paragraphs which follow the
specific conditions of replacement, which are identical with the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 4 of the
Decree. The first sentence of paragraph 4 of the De15

cree is the force by which White is enjoined and is
specific, clear and unambiguous. To adopt the same
language therein as is contained in the first paragraph of Finding No. 26 would make it open-€nded
and ambiguous and the specific subparagraphs which
follow of necessity would qualify and limit the preceding general language ; otherwise the Decree would
fail for vagueness. There is simply no way by which
Fairfield can distort paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree
to support its contention even if the rules of construction would permit it, which they do not.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT WHITE DID
NOT VIOLATE THE 1965 DECREE, AND ITS
ORDER MUST BE AFFIRMED.

Fairfield carefully selects those facts from the
evidence presented at the post-judgment hearing
most favorable to it and argues therefrom that White
has taken substantial quantities of ''their" water
contrary to the spirit and intent of the 1965 Decree.
It unfairly refers to the White replacement well as
"leaking" 0.12 cfs when in fact it flows up through
the casing and is discharged into Fairfield's ditches
for its use. Fairfield says it can get to the crux of
the matter by looking to the irrigation season of 1969,
and then for the convenience of the Court reproduces
and includes in its Brief a part of one of its graphs
which is in evidence. It then erroneously asserts that
White took that quantity of water represented by
the shaded part of the graph.
16

Thus, Fairfield would have this Court believe
that the fluctuations appearing on its reproduced
graph on page 7 of its Brief were all caused by the
pumping of White's well. The facts are as related by
Fairfield's own witness Lawrence, that when the water is backed up in the spring area to force the water
into Fairfield's ditches the discharge of the spring is
reduced. Likewise, when the water is turned from
one ditch to another (marked by red and blue vertical
lines on Exhibit 2) there are fluctuations in the
measured flow of the discharge of the Fairfield
Springs. Thus the decrease in the measured discharge of the Fairfield Springs from May 1 to May
2, 1969, as shown by Fairfield's graph, coincided
with a change from one ditch to the other (Exh· 2).
The same is true for the decreases on May 12, May
26, June 9 and June 21, 1969. As a matter of fact,
White did not even operate his well during the entire month of June, 1969 yet the fluctuations still occurred, and notably the decrease on June 9. Any reduction in flow resulting from changing from one
ditch to the other or backing the water up over the
springs cannot be attributable to White's well.
Fairfield repeatedly argues that the Decree does
not permit White to take "their water" in June and
replace it in October, as if that were the fact. Fairfield suggests that White purposely manipulates his
well to accomplish that result, which is simply not
borne out by the evidence. It picks the year 1969 to
complain about White's pumping because it suits its

L
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purposes, but it ignores the years 1968 and 1970.
The facts are that White pumped the one well during
parts of all of the months from May through November of 1968, did not pump in June, 1969, but did pump
during each of the months of May, July, August, September, October and November of 1969. Likewise
in 1970 White pumped during the months of May,
June, July and August. It can hardly be said therefrom that Fairfield's argument finds any support in
the evidence. In fact, Fairfield's own witness Lawrence was unable to tell one way or the other from the
hydrograph of the discharge of the Fairfield Springs
during the months of June and July, 1970 whether
the White well was then being pumped (Tr. 33, 34).
After all is said and done, the facts still remain ,
that during each year when White has pumped his
well since the entry of the 1965 Decree the Fairfield
Springs, as augmented by the 0.12 cfs of replacement
water, has remained above 4.1 cfs and Fairfield has
received at least 1600 acre feet of water during each
irrigation season. As such White has fully complied
with the conditions of paragraph 4 (a) of the 1965 Decree. The lower court expressly found that White did
not violate the 1965 Decree. Under the cardinal rules
of review, that Finding is presumed to be valid and
correct by this Court and it is Fairfield's burden here
to show error. This Fairfield has wholly failed to do.
The record in this case must be reviewed in the light
most favorable to such Finding and should not be disturbed since the evidence clearly supports it. Charlton v. Hackett, supra.
18

--Fairfield seeks on this appeal to reverse the refusal of the trial court to find that White violated the
1965 Decree. The correct rule here is that this Court
should not upset the trial court's refusal to so find
unless the evidence is such that all reasonable minds
would so conclude and thus compel such a finding.
Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Company, 23 Utah 2d 86,
458 P.2d 625 (1969). Under the record of this case
it would be absurd to say that the evidence compels
such a finding. Accordingly, the Order of the trial
court must in all respects be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH NOV AK
Attorney for
defendant and respondent
M. Kenneth White
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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